




















China’s Competition Policy Reforms:  
The Antimonopoly Law and Beyond  




More than twelve years have elapsed since China began its efforts to enact a 
comprehensive antitrust law.  Today, drafts of the law are still being debated, with no real 
signs of enactment.  Such a protracted legislative process is highly unusual in China, and 
can only be explained by the controversy the draft law generates.  After a brief review of 
China’s current competition policy and the new draft antitrust law, this paper discusses 
the fundamental issues in China’s economy that give rise to the challenges facing China’s 
antitrust policymakers in enacting the new antitrust law.  These issues include the role of 
state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition in China’s economy, mergers 
and acquisitions by foreign companies, the treatment of administrative monopolies, and 
the enforcement of the antitrust law.  While those controversies create significant policy 
issues for China, they do not constitute valid objections to the enactment of the new 
antitrust law.  Meanwhile, it will be important for China to recognize that the new 
antitrust law alone will not be sufficient to fully realize its goal of promoting competition 
in its economy; other reforms will be necessary as well.  China will be better off by 
moving swiftly to enact the new antitrust law, while keeping the momentum to engage in 
those other reforms.  
 
 
                                                 
∗   Owen (bruceowen@stanford.edu ) is the Morris M. Doyle Centennial Professor in Public Policy 
at Stanford University, and the Gordon Cain Senior Fellow in the Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research. Sun (sun.s@ei.com) is a Senior Economist at the Washington DC office of 
Economists Incorporated. Zheng (wtzheng2000@yahoo.com) is an attorney at the Washington, 
D.C. office of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.  The views expressed in this paper are entirely the 
authors’ own and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which the authors are 
affiliated.    - 2 - 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court of the United States once characterized antitrust law as the “Magna 
Carta” of free enterprise.
1  By promoting free and fair competition, antitrust law has supported 
market economies in the West in several important ways.  First, it promotes economic efficiency, 
by making sure that goods are made by the firm which can produce them at lowest cost, and that 
goods flow to those consumers who value the goods the most.  Second, antitrust law seeks to 
protect customers, both individuals and businesses, against the creation and exercise of undue 
market power.  Third, antitrust law is an aspect of broader competition policy, which seeks to 
promote private competitive markets as alternatives to state-owned monopolies or regulated 
monopolies.  
For countries that had been operating under centrally planned economic systems, 
however, “competition” is an unfamiliar concept.  In recent years, as more and more centrally-
planned economies are making their transitions to market-oriented economies, attention is being 
paid to the importance of competition as an institution.  As a result, those transitional economies 
are increasingly looking to the antitrust laws developed in Western countries for guidance in 
designing their competition policies.   
As the largest and fastest-growing transitional economy in the world, China currently has 
many laws dealing with various aspects of antitrust issues.  China’s current antitrust rules, 
however, are fragmented, and lack many essential components of what would be considered a 
complete set of antitrust policy tools.  To address the shortcomings of its current antitrust rules, 
China in 1994 began its efforts to enact a comprehensive antitrust law, or the so-called 
Antimonopoly Law (“AML”).  In recent years, numerous drafts of the AML have been circulated 
and commented on, and the draft AML has been placed on the legislative agenda of the National 
People’s Congress a number of times.  
Yet today, more than twelve years later, drafts of the AML are still being debated, 
without any real signs of enactment.  Such a protracted legislative process is highly unusual in 
China, where the law-making process is controlled largely by the government.  In China, 
important legislation usually can be marshaled through the legislative process very quickly, once 
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the leadership reaches consensus on the legislation.  The last time China had a prolonged 
legislative process for an important law was its drafting and enactment of the Securities Law in 
the 1990s.  In the case of the Securities Law, it took China six years to complete the legislative 
process, and Chinese policymakers characterized the difficulties encountered in enacting the law 
as “unprecedented.”
2  In enacting the AML, China already spent twice amount the time it spent 
on enacting the Securities Law, and yet still sees no signs of enactment.  Judging from China’s 
experience with the enactment of the Securities Law, the difficulties behind the AML can only 
be more substantial.  
Many in the West may wonder what those difficulties are.  Why is it taking China so long 
to reach a consensus on an antitrust law, a law considered so important in a market economy?  
This article aims to answer that question.  As we will demonstrate below, the answer to that 
question lies not with the technical aspects of the antitrust issues commonly found in a mature 
market economy, but with the fundamental issues arising from China’s historic transformation 
from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy.  Those issues include the role of the 
state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition, mergers and acquisitions by foreign 
companies, the treatment of administrative monopolies, and antitrust enforcement.  Apparently it 
is those controversial issues—not the debates on the technicalities of the draft law—that are 
holding back the legislative process for the AML.  However, as we will see in the discussions 
below, the resolution of those controversial issues needs not precede the adoption of the new 
antitrust law.   
Meanwhile, due to China’s unique political, economic, and legal backgrounds, its goal of 
promoting competition will not be fully realized by using the AML alone.  Other reforms, such 
as reforms of the state-owned enterprises and reforms aimed at limiting the role of the 
government in the economy, will also be important parts of China’s competition policy reforms.  
                                                 
2   See, e.g., Drafters of the Securities Law Speak on the “Blue Skies” Law, SECURITIES DAILY, 
http://business.sohu.com/2004/07/01/72/article220797217.shtml (last visited March 28, 2007).  
China began drafting the Securities Law in 1992, two years after China’s first stock market 
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China’s “socialist market economy,” the treatment of state-owned capital in the securities market, 
and the scope of securities regulations.  It was not until 1998 that China settled on a final draft 
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China should take an incremental approach and move swiftly to enact the AML, while keeping 
the momentum to actively engage in those related reforms.  
This article is organized as follows.  Section II presents a brief overview of China’s 
current antitrust rules as well as a summary of the major components of the proposed AML.  
Section III discusses China’s economic, regulatory, and legal contexts.  Section IV focuses on 
the fundamental issues in China’s economy that give rise to the challenges facing China’s 
antitrust policymakers in enacting the AML.  Section V concludes.  
 
II.  CHINA’S CURRENT AND PROPOSED ANTITRUST LAWS 
A.  China’s Current Antitrust Rules 
China’s current competition policy is found in a number of specific laws and 
administrative rules.  The most comprehensive of these is the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 
promulgated in 1993.
3  The Anti-Unfair Competition Law contains some provisions that are 
usually found in antitrust law, such as prohibition of tie-in sales in Article 12 and prohibition of 
price fixing and bid rigging in Article 15.  But the Anti-Unfair Competition Law also addresses 
many other issues, including bribery, deceptive advertising, coercive sales, and appropriation of 
business secrets.  To a large extent, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law is more like a consumer 
protection law than an antitrust law. 
Antitrust provisions are also scattered in more specialized laws.  For example, the 
Commercial Banking Law passed in 1995 includes an article that prohibits banks from engaging 
in “improper competition.”
4  The Price Law passed in 1997 has provisions against “improper 
pricing behaviors” including price fixing, predatory pricing and price discrimination, to name a 
                                                 
3    For the Chinese text of this law, see 
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few.
5  The Procurement and Bidding Law passed in 1999 prohibits bid rigging.
6  Most recently, 
China has revised the 2001 Patent Law for the third time and provisions against patent abuse that 
excludes or restricts competition have been added under Chapter Six on compulsory licensing.
7 
More often, competition issues are directly addressed by the issuance of administrative 
rules and regulations.  Sometimes administrative rules are used to address new issues that require 
a quick response. Other times they provide more detailed interpretations of previously 
promulgated laws. The following are some important administrative rules regarding competition 
issues: 
•  In 1993, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) issued 
Rules on Prohibiting Public Utility Companies from Restricting Competition,
 8 
which was meant to reign in widespread abuse of monopoly positions by public 
utility companies.  
•  In April 2001, the State Council, China’s cabinet, issued the Rules on Prohibiting 
Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities.
9  This regulation deals with a 
major form of administrative monopoly where local government agencies 
deliberately discriminate against products and services provided by other 
localities and oftentimes simply deny them access to the local market.  
                                                 
5   See Article 14 of the Price Law, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=29493&str1=%BC%DB%B8%F1%B7%A8 
(last visited March 28, 2007). 
6   See Article 32 of the Procurement and Bidding Law, 
http://www.cin.gov.cn/law/main/1999092101.htm (last visited March 28, 2007).  
7   For China’s current Patent Law, see 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/flfg/zlf/200608/t20060831_109702.htm (last visited March 28, 
2007).  The third revision is now under review at the State Council Legislative Affairs Office. 
8   See Rules on Prohibiting Public Utility Companies from Restricting Competition, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/i/s/200503/20050300027927.html (last visited March 28, 
2007).  
9   See Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/i/s/200503/20050300027985.html (last visited March 28, 
2007).    - 6 - 
•  Another regulation is the Provisional Rules on Prevention of Monopoly Pricing 
issued by the State Development and Reform Commission in 2003.
10  The Rules 
prohibit the abuse of “market dominance” and infers dominance through “market 
share in the relevant market, substitutability of relevant goods, and ease of new 
entry.”  The Rules also prohibit price coordination, supply restriction, bid rigging, 
vertical price restraint, below-cost-pricing and price discrimination as abuses of 
dominance. Finally, the Rules prohibit government agencies from “illegally 
intervening” in market price determinations.  
These regulations generally do not have a clear and credible enforcement mechanism, and their 
implementation has been largely ineffective. 
To address rising concerns about foreign acquisitions of Chinese companies, six 
government agencies jointly issued the Rules on Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors (“M&A Rules”) in 2006.
11  Article 51 of the M&A Rules lays out the four 
conditions under which pre-merger notification to China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) 
and the SAIC is required.  The four conditions include thresholds that relate to annual sales, the 
number of enterprises the foreign party has previously acquired in related industries and the 
merging parties’ market shares.  The M&A Rules, however, suffer from a number of 
deficiencies.
12  
To aid the implementation of the M&A Rules, in March, 2007, MOFCOM posted on its 
web site the Antitrust Filing Guidelines.
13  The Guidelines in most part resemble similar 
                                                 
10   See Provisional Rules on Prevention of Monopoly Pricing, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/i/s/200503/20050300028008.html (last visited March 28, 
2007).  
11   See Rules on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
http://www.xasmw.com/rule/content.asp?id=254 (last visited March 28, 2007).  A Provisional 
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2007).  
12   For a brief discussion of some of the problems in the M&A Rules, see Su Sun, Antitrust Review 
in China’s New Merger Regulation, ECONOMISTS INK, Winter 2007. 
13   See Antitrust Filing Guidelines, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bb/200703/20070304440611.html (last visited March 28, 2007).    - 7 - 
guidelines and procedures adopted by other jurisdictions and are helpful for parties who wish to 
understand when and what to file.  However, the filing requirements in the Guidelines seem to be 
overly burdensome to merging parties.
14   
 
B.  China’s Proposed Antimonopoly Law  
As can be seen from the discussion above, China’s current laws and regulations dealing 
with antitrust-related issues are fragmented.  Oftentimes, provisions of those laws and 
regulations are vague and repetitive, and the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement is greatly 
reduced by the existence of multiple enforcement agencies authorized by different laws.  In part 
as a response to the perceived shortcomings of China’s current antitrust rules, China has been 
trying to enact a comprehensive antitrust law, the Antimonopoly Law (“AML”), to consolidate 
the antitrust provisions into a uniform set of rules.  
The drafting of the AML started in 1994, soon after the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law was promulgated.  Two government agencies, the State Economic and Trade Commission 
(“SETC”) and the SAIC were in charge of the drafting.  The SETC was abolished in a 
government restructuring in 2003 and MOFCOM has since taken its place as the main drafter of 
the AML.
15  By 2002, a draft had taken shape and soon began circulating in small circles for 
comment.  The next couple years saw a number of revisions.  In March 2004, a draft was 
submitted to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office for review.  After several more 
revisions, a draft was submitted to the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) Standing Committee 
for review in June 2006.  So far, the NPC Standing Committee has done the first reading
16 and 
more readings are expected later this year. 
                                                 
14   The ABA Antitrust Section and International Section have made detailed comments on the 
Guidelines.  See 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC860000/newsletterpubs/abaprcforeignm&a
filingguidelinescommentsfinalcombo.pdf (last visited March 28, 2007).  
15   See Ming Shang, China’s Competition Policy and Legislation in Development, April 22, 2005, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/dzgg/f/200504/20050400081489.html (last visited March 28, 
2007).  
16   The NPC Standing Committee members have made a number of comments on this draft during 
their first review.  See   - 8 - 
The AML drafting process, though not public and transparent, did involve a small circle 
of experts and practitioners, both from China and from other parts of the world.  Seminars and 
conferences were held in China and in other jurisdictions including the U.S. and Europe.  
Foreign enforcement officials, scholars and practicing attorneys frequently spoke at seminars and 
conferences and commented on the drafts.  The ABA alone made several rounds of comments on 
different drafts of the AML.
17  The various revisions of the draft AML appear to have 
incorporated comments made by various parties.  Through these many rounds of comments and 
revisions, the draft AML has been improved substantially, and Chinese government officials also 
seem to have gained more knowledge and better understanding about competition issues 
generally.  
The current draft of the AML, released in June 2006, consists of eight chapters.
18  
Chapter one describes the general principles of the AML, including objectives, applicability and 
coverage.  Chapter Two describes which monopoly agreements are prohibited and which are 
exempted.  Chapter Three prohibits the abuse of market dominant position.  It provides methods 
to infer dominance and describes abusive behaviors.  Chapter Four provides for agency review of 
proposed mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, specifying the notification thresholds and 
exemptions, required documents, and review procedures.  Chapter Five is devoted to prohibitions 
of anticompetitive activity by government agencies.  This chapter incorporates some of the prior 
administrative rules and focuses in particular on various forms of local protectionism.  Chapter 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350218&pdmc=110106 (last 
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17   See Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and 
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(last visited March 28, 2007). 
18    We have made detailed comments on a similar earlier draft of AML previously.  See Bruce 
Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility, 1 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 123-48 (2005).  We are also in agreement with 
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Six proposes two enforcement authorities: an Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency that issues 
guidelines, reviews merger notifications, and investigates suspected anticompetitive behavior in 
the marketplace, and an Antimonopoly Commission at the cabinet level that conducts policy 
research, oversees the work of the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, and coordinates work 
among other regulatory agencies and on major cases.  Chapter Seven describes liability and 
penalties for violating the AML.  This chapter also provides reduced penalties for voluntarily 
assisting the enforcement authority’s investigation in monopolistic agreement cases.  The last 
Chapter states that trade associations are subject to the AML, agricultural activities are generally 
exempted, and an intellectual property right is not to be regarded as a per se unlawful monopoly 
but the abuse of such rights to restrict competition is subject to the AML. 
 
III.  CHINA’S ECONOMIC, REGULATORY, AND LEGAL CONTEXTS  
Before we turn to the fundamental issues giving rise to the challenges facing China’s 
antitrust policymakers in enacting the AML, a brief discussion of China’s economic, regulatory, 
and legal contexts in which those issues arise is in order.
19 The formulation of competition policy 
in a country does not happen in vacuum; instead, it is closely tied to the economic, political, and 
legal contexts of the country.  This is particularly so in China, as the AML is being drafted 
against the backdrop of China’s historic transformation from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy.   
 
A.  China’s Economic Context 
When economic reforms started in 1978, China’s economy was dominated by the state, 
and private enterprises played only a negligible role.  With factories essentially being units of the 
state productive machinery, there was little role for competition.  At times the government 
promoted “labor competition” among factories or production units in an effort to indoctrinate the 
populace with communist ideology, but competition motivated by profits was condemned as a 
symptom of corrupt capitalist systems. 
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In 1992, China significantly accelerated its pace of economic reform after the inspection 
tour of the southern regions by its paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping.  In the fall of 1992, the 14
th 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party officially declared that the central goal of China’s 
economic reform is to establish a “socialist market economy.”  In the following decade, far-
reaching reform measures were undertaken to overhaul China’s SOE sector, taxation, banking, 
and foreign currency systems.  Private enterprises grew rapidly, and large amounts of foreign 
investment flowed in.   
Now, nearly thirty years after the start of economic reform in 1978, China’s economic 
structures have undergone dramatic changes.  One of the most significant changes is the decline 
of the importance of the SOEs and other state-controlled enterprises and the emergence of the 
country’s private sector.  According to a national census on the composition of China’s 
economic entities completed in 2003, among three million enterprises that existed on December 
31, 2001, SOEs and enterprises with a controlling share held by the State accounted for 56.2 
percent of capital invested and 49.6 percent of annual revenue.
20  Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that since 2001, further economic reform has lowered the share of SOEs in China’s economy to 
about one-third.
21  This is a remarkable contrast with 1978, when all enterprises were state-
owned. 
Despite the increasingly important role of the private sector in China’s economy, private 
enterprises in China are mostly small in size.  In fact, 99 percent of the enterprises in China are 
small or medium size, with most of them funded by private investment.
22  According to 
government statistics, by the end of 2003, China’s small and medium sized enterprises consisted 
of 55.6 percent of the country’s GDP, 74.7 percent of industrial production value added, 58.9 
percent of retail sales, 46.2 percent of tax revenues and 62.3 percent of exports.
23  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
20   See State Bureau of Statistics, Report on the Second National Census on Basic Economic Entities, 
January 17, 2003, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/jbdwpcgb/qgjbdwpcgb/t20030117_61467.htm 
(last visited March 28, 2007).  
21   See Yingqiu Liu, The General Trends and Problems of China’s Private Economic Sectors, 
JOURNAL OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, June, 2006, 
http://www.cpes.cass.cn/viewInfo.asp?id=351 (last visited March 28, 2007). 
22   See id. 
23   See Non-public Economy Blooming in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200407/28/eng20040728_151132.html (last updated July 28, 2004).   - 11 - 
SOEs remain the largest enterprises in China, largely concentrated in important industries such 
as electricity, petroleum, railroads, aviation, telecommunications, and banking. 
 
B.  China’s Regulatory Context 
At the same time that China’s economic structure is undergoing fundamental changes, the 
regulatory structure of China is also being transformed to one more compatible with the 
requirements of a market economy.  Before China’s economic reforms, China’s economic 
system was modelled after that of the former Soviet Union.  For almost every major industry, a 
corresponding ministry existed within the government to control, manage, and coordinate the 
production in that industry.  There was no need for government “regulation,” as the word is used 
in the Western countries; the industries were already directly owned and managed by the state.  It 
is when China began to reduce central direction of its economy after the commencement of its 
economic reforms that China faced the question of what industries to regulate, and how.  
Realizing the problems associated with undue government intervention in the economy, 
the Chinese government has made a strategic choice to retreat from such “non-essential” 
industries as machinery, electronics, chemicals, and textiles.  Those industries do not tend to 
create conditions of “natural monopoly,” do not impinge upon national security and public 
goods, and usually are not regulated in market economies.  In several rounds of government 
restructuring since 1978, China has gradually dissolved the government ministries overseeing 
those industries and has replaced them with so-called “chambers of commerce” or “industrial 
associations” representing and coordinating various interests in those industries.
24  
In industries considered key to China’s national security and economic development, 
such as electricity, petroleum, banking, insurance, railroads, and aviation, the Chinese 
government has chosen to retain or strengthen its dominant roles.  In those key industries, the 
dominant firms remain mostly state-owned.  As a result, the government plays two roles: it is 
both the owner of the major players and the referee, i.e., the regulator.  This double-role is now 
seen as detrimental to the development of China’s market economy.  Among the steps that have 
                                                 
24   Leiming Wang, Lutao Shen & Sheng Zou, Five Comprehensive Government Restructures 1982-
2003, Xinhua News Agency (Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/10434/10435/20030306/937651.html (last visited 
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been taken to address this problem, the foremost has been to establish separate regulatory 
agencies for the key industries and to strip the SOEs in those industries of the regulatory power 
bestowed upon them in the planned-economy era.  In so doing, the Chinese government hopes to 
separate the government’s functions as a player and as a regulator.  For example, between 1998 
and 2004, China established the Insurance Regulatory Commission, the Banking Regulatory 
Commission, and the Electric Power Regulatory Commission, which are charged with 
overseeing the insurance, banking, and electricity industries, respectively.  The largest 
enterprises in those three industries, all state-owned, along with enterprises of other ownership 
forms that may emerge in the future, are subject to regulation by those new agencies.  
Furthermore, to strengthen government control over SOEs in key industries and to stop the rapid 
loss of state assets, China in 2003 established the State Assets Management Commission to 
oversee the operation of state-owned assets by SOEs.  
 
C.  China’s Legal Context 
As China’s economy is being transformed from a centrally-planned one to a market-
oriented one, China’s legal system is undergoing changes accordingly.  The focus of China’s 
legislative in most of the past thirty years has been on economic laws, most notably contract law, 
bankruptcy law, corporate law, foreign investment law, securities law, and the like.  The AML is 
another example of China’s efforts to guide economic behaviors by reliance on well-defined 
rules of economic law.   
Although China has enacted many much-needed economic laws, the enforcement of such 
laws oftentimes is less than satisfactory.  Various government agencies charged with 
implementing the government’s regulatory policies have the authority to enforce economic 
statutes and regulations in their respective areas.  Similarly, enforcement of the AML will be 
carried out by the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, an administrative agency.  However, 
enforcement by administrative agencies in China in many cases is not transparent or predictable.  
First, the rule making processes at the administrative agencies are not subject to uniform 
standards, as China has yet to have a law specifying the procedures administrative agencies are 
required to follow when making regulations.
25  Second, the actions by administrative agencies 
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are now subject to judicial review by the People’s Courts, thanks to China’s enactment of the 
Administrative Litigation Law in 1989.  The quality of the judicial review provided by the 
Administrative Litigation Law, however, is quite limited.  Among the problems with judicial 
review of administrative actions most cited by commentators are the narrow scope and 
convoluted procedures of the review, and the persistent bias in favor of government agencies.
26 
The People’s Courts have problems of their own keeping up with the demands placed on 
them by China’s burgeoning economy.  Although the Chinese Constitution states that the 
People’s Courts shall exercise their judicial power independently, in practice there is no 
institutional guarantee of judicial independence.  Further complicating the matter is the poor 
quality of the judges.  Until recently, a large portion of Chinese judges had been selected from 
retired military officers.  Those judges generally have no legal training or experience, and are ill-
equipped to handle complicated cases.  Although in recent years the overall quality of Chinese 
judges has been improving, it remains in doubt whether Chinese judges, most of whom are not 
trained in economics, will be competent to handle antitrust cases to be brought under the 
proposed AML.  Finally, the lack of stare decisis in China will also reduce the effectiveness of 
the judicial interpretation of the AML.  China’s civil law tradition leaves no place for “judge-
made” law.  Although the Supreme People’s Court has the power to interpret laws as they arise 
from legal cases, its legal interpretation cannot be cited by other courts and does not serve the 
function of precedents as it would in common law countries.  This means that potential litigants 
cannot base expectations of what courts will do under a particular factual circumstance on prior 
decisions under similar circumstances.  Indeed, there is no mechanism for doing so—judges in 
China generally do not write detailed opinions that are published.  Expectations about the 
behavior of courts are thus difficult to form. 
 
IV.  FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CHINA’S COMPETITION POLICY REFORMS 
As we will see below, the most significant competition policy issues in China are 
inextricably tied to the fundamental issues arising from China’s historic transformation from a 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
26   For more details on China’s judicial review of administrative actions, see Chris X. Lin, A Quiet 
Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 
9 (June 2003).   - 14 - 
centrally-planned economy to a market economy.  It is those underlying issues, such as the role 
of state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition in China’s economy, mergers and 
acquisitions by foreign companies, the treatment of administrative monopolies, and the 
enforcement of the antitrust law, that pose the most significant challenges to China’s antitrust 
policymakers in enacting the AML.  It is also those fundamental issues—and China’s responses 
to them—that will define the parameters of China’s future competition policies.   
A.  The Role of State-Owned Enterprises  
The primary goal of the antitrust law is to encourage competition.  It is the lack of 
competition in China’s economy in general and in the state-owned sectors in particular that 
prompted China to start its efforts to enact a comprehensive antitrust law in the first place.  
However, as China has also sought to strengthen the role of SOEs in certain key sectors in recent 
years, how to bring the SOEs in those sectors into the framework to be established by the new 
antitrust law seems to have posed a challenge to China’s antitrust policymakers.   
As noted above, when China first embarked on economic reforms in 1978, almost all of 
the economic entities in China’s economy were SOEs.  By the early 1990s, despite the 
significant progress China had made in other aspects of the reforms, SOEs still accounted for an 
overwhelming percentage of China’s economy.  In almost every sector, market entry was tightly 
controlled by the government and consumers were left with no meaningful choices but to 
patronize state-approved SOEs, leaving those SOEs with what many consider undeservedly high 
profits.  Complaints about the abuse by SOEs of their market power abounded.  It is perhaps not 
a coincidence that soon after China decided to accelerate the market-oriented reforms in 1992, in 
1994 China started the legislating process for its first comprehensive antitrust law.  
Since the early 1990s, when China was beginning its efforts to enact a comprehensive 
antitrust law, it also implemented various ad hoc measures aimed at introducing more 
competition into the stagnant sectors controlled by SOEs.  The government, as owner of the 
SOEs, broke up many SOEs into multiple entities intended to compete with each other.  The 
restructuring of China’s telecommunication industry serves as an example.  Before 1994, China’s 
telecommunication industry was monopolized by China Telecom.  In 1994, the Chinese 
government formed China Unicom, a telecommunication provider that was chartered to compete 
with China Telecom in mobile phone and pager services.  In 1999, China Telecom was broken   - 15 - 
up into two separate entities: China Mobile that provided mobile phone services and a new China 
Telecom that provided landline services.  In the same year, the Chinese government issued 
landline licenses to several newly formed companies to compete with the newly formed China 
Telecom.  In the next round of restructuring in 2002, China Telecom was further divided and 
integrated with other telecommunication companies to form two “competing” landline providers: 
China Netcom based in Northern China and China Telecom based in Southern China. 
Although those ad hoc competition-enhancing measures were successful in breaking up 
de facto monopolies, the competition they introduced is often very limited.  The 
telecommunications industry again is an example.  The two landline providers created by the 
government in 2002, China Netcom and China Telecom, are based in mutually exclusive 
territories.  And in February 2007, the two companies signed an agreement not to compete for 
landline customers in the other’s territory.
27   
While China has taken action to reduce the role of SOEs in most economic sectors, in 
certain sectors deemed to be of strategic importance to China’s economy, the control by SOEs is 
still very significant, and in many cases has even increased.  As of 2006, eighty percent of the 
assets controlled by SOEs were concentrated in eight “strategic sectors” such as petroleum and 
electricity generation.  SOEs accounted for almost all of the production of petroleum, natural gas, 
and ethylene, provided all of the basic telecommunication services, generated approximately 
fifty-five percent of electricity, and flew about eighty-two percent of passengers and cargo 
through the country’s air transportation system.
28   
Indeed, at the same time that China is drafting the new antitrust law, China has made it a 
stated goal to maintain the dominant role of SOEs in certain sectors.  On December 18, 2006, the 
State Assets Management Commission announced that seven “strategic” industries, including 
national defense, electrical power generation and grids, petroleum and petro-chemicals, 
telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and waterway transportation, will be controlled by 
                                                 
27   See China Telecom and China Netcom Reaching Agreement Not to Compete for Landline 
Customers, BEIJING MORNING DAILY, February 27, 2007, http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2007-02-
27/01011391578.shtml (last visited March 28, 2007). 
28   See Breaking Up Monopolies Key to the Restructuring of SOEs, LIAOWANG, December 13, 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/13/content_5480196.htm (last visited March 28, 
2007).   - 16 - 
SOEs.
29  The government will aim to increase the state capital infusion in those seven industries, 
and will seek to maintain “absolute control” of them by SOEs.
30  The State Assets Management 
Commission also announced that it is China’s goal to foster thirty to fifty large “internationally 
competitive” SOEs in those industries by the year of 2010.
31  In other important industries (but 
less important than the seven strategic industries), including automobile, steel, and technology, 
the government will seek to maintain “somewhat strong influence” by state capital on the leading 
companies.
32 
So how does China’s desire to promote SOEs in strategic and other important sectors fit 
into its overall antitrust scheme?  In particular, will China’s professed goal of forming 
conglomerate SOEs in certain strategic sectors run afoul of the antitrust law, which, according to 
the latest draft, will outlaw the abuse of market power by monopolies, regardless of ownership 
status and sectors?  How to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory goals—encouraging 
competition on one hand and maintaining control by SOEs on the other—is a challenge to 
China’s policymakers and is likely to have contributed to the prolonged debate on the draft 
antitrust law.  
But in truth it is not at all clear whether China needs to maintain strong controls by SOEs 
in what it considers to be strategic or important economic sectors.  At least one prominent 
economist has pointed out that the purpose of such state ownership in those sectors can be 
equally accomplished by strict government regulations and strict law enforcement.
33  But even if 
China has reasons to believe that state ownership is necessary, that is not necessarily 
incompatible with encouraging competition.  After all, for most industries, China’s goal is only 
                                                 
29   See State Assets Commission, Guidance on the Restructuring of State Capital and State Owned 
Enterprises, December 18, 2006, http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20061218/11133173443.shtml (last 
visited March 28, 2007); see also SOEs to Maintain Overwhelming Control in Seven Sectors, 
XINHUA NET, December 19, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-
12/19/content_5504591.htm (last visited March 28, 2007).   
30   See id. 
31   See id. 
32   See id. 
33   See Lawrence Lau, The Dual Dilemmas of SOE Reforms, CAIJING MAGAZINE, December 4, 
2005, http://www.e-economic.com/info/4495-1.htm (last visited March 28, 2007).   - 17 - 
to maintain state ownership of the companies, but not to confer monopoly status on any 
particular company or group of companies.  It is entirely possible to have state ownership of the 
companies in one sector, and yet to have that state ownership distributed in dozens, or even 
hundreds of SOEs competing against each other and against private firms.
34  
In some sense, this approach—maintaining state ownership yet allowing more 
competition—is the approach China has taken already with respect to certain sectors.  One 
example is the restructuring of the telecommunications industry, i.e., breaking up an existing 
SOE monopoly into multiple SOEs and thus introducing more competition.  In addition, China 
has also taken steps to allow private enterprises to enter sectors that were previously off limits to 
them.  On February 25, 2005, China’s State Council promulgated the Opinions on Encouraging, 
Supporting, and Guiding the Development of Private Capital and Other Non State-Owned 
Capital (“Opinions”).
35  The Opinions specifically allowed private capital to enter sectors such 
as electricity, telecommunications, railroad, civil aviation, petroleum, public utilities, financial 
services, social services, and national defence.  More importantly, the Opinions allowed market 
entry by private enterprises as long as such entry is not expressly prohibited by the law, and 
allowed market entry by domestic private enterprises if foreign investors are allowed such entry.    
China’s efforts to introduce more competition in sectors previously monopolized by 
SOEs and to open up more sectors to private enterprises have yielded some successes.  In the 
civil aviation industry, for example, four private airlines have come into operation since 2005.
36  
In the telecommunications industry, one private company has been allowed to provide call center 
services.
37   
                                                 
34   However, some argue that SOEs may have stronger incentives to act anticompetitively.  See 
David E.M. Sappington  & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises, 71 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 479-523 (2003).  For SOEs to compete efficiently, competition must 
be an explicit goal of the government as equity owner in the firms. 
35   State Council Doc. No. [2005]3, February 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/795128.htm (last visited March 12, 2007). 
36   The four private airlines are Aokai Airlines, based in Tianjin; Chunqiu Airlines, based in 
Shanghai; Yinglian Airlines, based in Chengdu, Sichuan Province; and Dongxing Airlines, based 
in Wuhan, Hubei Province.  
37   The private company that was allowed to provide call center services was Dongxing Guolu.   - 18 - 
These successes notwithstanding, China still has a long way to go in terms of promoting 
competition in the sectors controlled by SOEs.  Although some of those sectors have seen an 
increase in the level of competition, the competition thus introduced is very often very limited 
and the consumers are still all too often left at the whim of the SOEs.  Subjecting the SOEs in 
most sectors—particularly in those sectors the government has already allowed foreign and 
private investors to enter—to the new antitrust law and thus putting those SOEs on the same 
footing with other companies will best serve China’s goal of encouraging competition.  And as 
analyzed above, this goal of encouraging competition is not necessarily incompatible with 
China’s goal of maintaining a strong presence by SOEs in certain sectors, provided that China 
structure the SOEs in ways that ensure both state ownership and competition.   
Meanwhile, in the “strategic” sectors where China has vowed to promote the formation of 
conglomerate SOEs that can compete internationally, the AML does not necessarily pose a 
hurdle either.  Many of those “strategic” sectors, such as electricity and telecommunications, are 
sectors where what economists call “natural monopoly” may arise and China could, as many 
developed countries do, opt for direct regulation of those sectors and grant some sort of antitrust 
immunity to those sectors.
38  Furthermore, even if China were to decide to grant some sort of 
exclusive status—and thus market power—to the key SOEs in the strategic sectors, such a 
decision needs not be a license for the SOEs to abuse the market power thus granted.  In any 
event, China’s alleged need to have absolute control by SOEs in certain strategic sectors does not 
provide an excuse for not enacting the antitrust law. 
Finally, it is worth noting that although the new antitrust law could play an important role 
in opening up many of the sectors currently monopolized by SOEs to new competition, it alone 
would not be sufficient for China to achieve that goal.  First, even if SOEs were to be subject to 
the new antitrust law, the response to market competition by SOEs depends on the other aspects 
of SOE reforms, particularly the reforms of SOE ownership structures and the SOE management.  
Second, the lack of competition in SOE-controlled sectors to a large degree is caused by the tight 
control of market entry by the government.  A more effective way of promoting competition, 
                                                 
38   For example, the federal law of the United States to various degrees grants antitrust immunity to 
some regulated industries such as insurance, railroad, and ocean transportation, although these 
exemptions are often criticized.  In addition, most developed countries now regard 
telecommunications services and large parts of the electricity sector as potentially competitive.   - 19 - 
therefore, is for the government to relax its control on market entry.  It is unclear whether the 
new antitrust law could compel the government to permit more market entry—presumably 
through its prohibition of “administrative monopolies,” a subject we will return to in section 
IV.D below.  But in any event, the problem of market entry can be solved by the government 
undertaking self-initiated market entry liberalization measures, of which the Opinions in 2005 is 
a notable example.  Finally, since the government is the ultimate owner of the SOEs and could 
restructure the SOEs as it chooses, another effective way of promoting competition is for the 
government to break up the monopolistic SOEs, without resorting to the new antitrust law, just 
as it did in the restructuring of the telecommunications industry.      
 
B.  “Excessive” Competition  
In recent years, at the same time that China is trying to curb the monopolistic abuses of 
SOEs, China’s policymakers are increasingly concerned about a new threat—the threat of 
“excessive” or “malignant” competition in many sectors.  To many, this contrast is perplexing.  It 
seems to have created another challenge for Chinese policymakers as they ponder how to deal 
with two problems that pull in opposite directions. 
So-called “excessive competition” is widespread in China.  A Google search on the 
Chinese internet using the Chinese characters for “excessive competition” yielded approximately 
one million hits, most of which are press reports of the intense competition in various industries.  
The industries covered in those press reports are diverse, including software, foods, travel 
agencies, household appliances, telecommunications, maritime shipping, pharmaceuticals, 
insurance, banking, waste recycling, machinery, mortgage, motor vehicles, periodicals, 
supermarkets, internet services, steel, textile and apparels, and even lotteries.  The most 
egregious examples of “malignant competition” reported by the Chinese media are the following: 
•  China’s Central TV reported in September 2006 that in the maritime shipping 
industry that operates between Shanghai and Japan, the level of competition 
among the shippers reached a point where the shippers incurred losses of $210 per   - 20 - 
smaller container and $420 per bigger container.  That translates into a loss of 
$760,000 per week for an average shipper.
39  
•  In recent years, the competition among China’s producers of diary products has 
been so intense that many of them resort to illegal means of cutting costs, 
resulting in scandalous incidents such as poisonous, recycled, and contaminated 
milk.
40 
•  In China’s household appliances industry, there is a widespread practice of 
engaging in libellous advertisement against competitors in the media to gain 
market shares.
41  
•  In China’s travel agency industry, it is not uncommon to have “zero” or even 
“negative” fees for tours, meaning that many travel agencies are paying customers 
to take tours with them.
42 
•  “Malignant competition” manifests itself not only in China’s domestic industries, 
but also in the country’s export sector.  In recent years, Chinese products have 
been the number one targets of antidumping investigations initiated by members 
of the WTO.  Many industry experts and top officials in China blame the 
excessive competition among China’s exporters for this situation.
43 
Needless to say, “excessive competition” has become a major perceived problem in the 
Chinese economy.  Some policymakers believe that most of China’s industries, except those 
                                                 
39   Malignant Competition Among SOEs in Shanghai’s Maritime Shipping Industry, 
http://news.tom.com/2006-09-22/0016/78319004.html (last visited March 28, 2007). 
40   Diary Companies’ Trust Crisis, ECONOMIC REFERENCE NEWSPAPER, July 31, 2005, 
http://chanye.finance.sina.com.cn/sp/2005-07-13/256435.shtml (last visited March 28, 2007). 
41   Ge Ling, Malignant Competition Rampant in China’s Household Appliances Industry, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE, http://homea.people.com.cn/GB/41394/3379837.html (last visited March 28, 
2007). 
42   Low Price Competition, Malicious Cycle: What China’s 10,000 Travel Agencies Should Do? 
XINHUA NET, http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/wangtan/djjz/lxsdjjz.htm (last visited March 28, 
2007). This may result from competing away of payments from airlines, tour operators, and 
others to the agencies. 
43   See, e.g., Long Yongtu: Excessive Competition Among Domestic Companies the Root Cause of 
Antidumping Cases, http://finance.anhuinews.com/system/2005/06/13/001282695.shtml (last 
visited March 28, 2007).    - 21 - 
industries in which the government deliberately maintains monopolies by SOEs—are 
characterized by “excessive competition.”
44   
Partly in consequence of perceptions of “excessive” competition in recent years, the 
government has taken some measures to rein in “excessive competition.”  Most of those 
measures involve what is called “industrial self-disciplines,” adopted under the direct supervision 
of the government.  Under the practice of “industrial self-disciplines,” the major companies in an 
industry reach price agreements or other agreements to limit competition, in an effort to stabilize 
the market.
45  The “chambers of commerce” that were converted from government ministries 
played important roles in the adoption of those “industrial self-disciplines.”  Indeed, this practice 
was officially sanctioned by the government in 1998.
46  These efforts mirror the experience of 
the United States’ during the Great Depression, when it was widely believed that excessive 
competition was responsible for deflationary price pressures and unemployment.  At that time, 
the Roosevelt Administration made various attempts to limit price competition.  These policies 
are now seen as unsound—they were harmful to consumers and probably prolonged the 
depression, which was not caused by “excessive” competition.    
Meanwhile, the government has also stepped up its efforts to limit the competition among 
China’s exporters to reduce their exposure to antidumping investigations by foreign 
governments.  For instance, in 2003 the government imposed an “advance approval” requirement 
for the export of thirty-six goods.
47  Under the requirement, exporters must first submit their 
                                                 
44   See Selected Comments on the Draft AML, NPC Standing Committee, June 30, 2006, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350218&pdmc=110106 (last 
visited March 28, 2007). 
45   For example, faced with growing inventory and price drops, China’s nine TV producers held a 
meeting in southern China in June 2000 to limit TV production and fix prices.  The attempted 
price cartel was not successful, however. 
46   See State Economic and Trade Commission (“SETC”), Opinions on Self-Disciplinary Prices 
Adopted by Some Industries, August 17, 1998, 
http://www.law999.net/law/doc/c001/1998/08/17/00107286.html (last visited March 28, 2007).  
Ironically, before its abolition in the 2003 government restructuring, the SETC was one of a few 
government agencies in charge of drafting the AML. 
47   See MOFCOM and Customs Authority Circular 36 of 2003, Advance Approval Requirement for 
the Export of Thirty-Six Goods, November 29, 2003, 
http://www1.customs.gov.cn/Default.aspx?TabID=433&InfoID=11070&SettingModuleID=1427 
(last visited March 28, 2007).   - 22 - 
export contracts to the respective chambers of commerce for approval prior to export.  It is 
immediately obvious to a student of antitrust that policies such as the “industrial self-disciplines” 
and “advance approval” to a large degree function as government-sponsored price cartels.  
However, in implementing those policies, the government apparently did not seem to be 
concerned about their antitrust implications.
48  
In the face of widespread “excessive competition,” some of China’s policymakers have 
questioned whether China needs to have an antitrust law when the competition in most sectors of 
China’s economy is already “excessive.”
49  To many, China’s problem is not that there is too 
little competition, but that there is too much.  What China needs, they believe, is to consolidate 
the smaller companies into bigger and stronger ones that can compete in the international 
markets.
50   
Although “excessive competition” exists in China’s economy, the implication seen by 
some policymakers—that China may not need the proposed antitrust law—is misguided.  The 
term “excessive competition” is a misnomer.  Competition of the kind the antitrust law is 
intended to promote can never be “excessive.”  Most examples of “excessive competition” found 
in China’s economy are not examples of there being too much competition; rather, they are 
examples of competition going awry.  Common to almost all those examples of “excessive 
competition” is the fact that the competitors have engaged in illegal or even criminal acts that 
violate the existing competition laws, product safety laws and consumer protection laws or 
would have violated the new antitrust law were it in effect today.  The fact that such practices are 
widespread in China only underscores, rather than detracts from, China’s need to strictly enforce 
the existing laws and to enact the proposed antitrust law.  Only through effective enforcement of 
such laws can competition be channelled to deliver maximum benefits to consumers.   
Therefore, in sectors where “excessive competition” exists, China’s problem is not that 
there is too much competition, but that such competition is carried out in a less-than-ideal 
                                                 
48   Ironically, the antitrust problems associated with those competition-limiting policies were 
perhaps first brought to the attention of the Chinese policymakers by three antitrust lawsuits filed 
in the United States in 2005 and 2006 alleging price fixings by Chinese exporters of Vitamin C, 
magnesite, and bauxite .  
49   See supra note 44.   
50   See, e.g., comments by Mr. Zheng Gongcheng, supra note 44.   - 23 - 
manner, thanks to the absence or lax enforcement of relevant laws, or to market imperfections 
that undermine the beneficial effects of competition.  Competition itself should always be 
welcomed, especially when it is not good for competitors.  This has been a hard-learned lesson 
for many developed countries.  The United States, for example, at one point wondered whether it 
should strictly enforce its antitrust laws during the Great Depression, when (as noted above) 
increasing competition and falling prices were causing widespread distresses in its economy.
51 
Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually held the line.
52   
In sum, in addressing the “excessive competition” prevalent in its economy, China should 
focus on ways to change the way competition is carried out, not ways to limit competition itself.  
“Excessive competition” in any event does not constitute a reason for not enacting the proposed 
AML.  Instead, the proposed AML will be an important addition to China’s toolkit as it tries to 
promote competition that benefits consumers.  
Finally, it will be important for China’s policymakers to keep in mind that in addition to 
strictly enforcing the antitrust laws, broader reforms will be needed to address the root causes of 
“excessive competition.”  First, additional SOE reforms will likely have significant impacts on 
reducing the disruptive competition that in many cases amounts to predatory pricing.  It has been 
noted that China’s SOEs are the driving forces behind many of the most notorious examples of 
“excessive competition,” due to their abilities to absorb unlimited losses that purely commercial 
entities would not be willing or have the ability to absorb.  For instance, in the Shanghai 
maritime shipping example cited above, the Chinese media have noted that all of the firms 
remaining in the industry are SOEs.
53  Second, Chinese companies have been overly relying on 
                                                 
51   Similarly, Article 10 of the current draft of the AML exempts agreements among competitors to 
resolve slow sales and large inventories during economic downturns. 
52   The U.S. practice had been treating price fixing agreements as per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act.  In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the creation of an exclusive joint selling agency by 137 Appalachian 
producers of bituminous coal was reasonable and therefore did not violate the Sherman Act.  In 
so holding, the U.S. Supreme Court was greatly influenced by the dismal conditions in the 
industry caused by the Great Depression.  Seven years later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed course.  In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Supreme 
Court rejected the approach it took in Appalachian Coal and unequivocally reaffirmed the per se 
rule for horizontal price fixing.  
53   See supra note 39.   - 24 - 
price competition, but not on technological innovation, to attract customers in both domestic and 
international markets.  This puts significant pressures on companies to cut costs, by all means 
possible, even if such cost-cutting measures would violate product safety laws, consumer 
protection laws, labor laws or antitrust laws.  The lack of technological innovation is a larger 
problem in China’s economy that needs to be dealt with through broader reforms, such as 
reforms of intellectual property rights protection and even educational reforms.  Finally, China’s 
economic growth has been overly relying on investment and export, but not on domestic 
consumption. Much has been said, rightly or wrongly, about the effect of China’s economic 
growth model on the global structural imbalance, but less attention has been paid to the 
implications of this economic growth model for China’s competition policies.  When Chinese 
consumers consume fewer products or services than producers are willing to supply, the 
competition among producers can only be expected to intensify.  And at a time when China’s 
law enforcement is less than ideal, this intensifying competition will in all likelihood go in the 
direction of hurting—rather than benefiting—consumers.  Broader reforms, such as 
macroeconomic policy reforms and consumer credit reforms, will likely be helpful in this regard.    
 
C.  Mergers and Acquisitions in China by Foreign Companies 
Foreign investors have played an important role in China’s economic revival since the 
very beginning of China’s economic reforms almost three decades ago.  In recent years, however, 
the role of foreign investment has become more controversial in China, as foreign investors 
stepped up their efforts to acquire Chinese companies and accelerated their penetration into 
China’s domestic markets.  As we will discuss below, this broader debate on the role of foreign 
investment has important implications for China’s antitrust policy.   
Upon China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China agreed to 
drastically reduced tariff levels and made numerous market access commitments regarding a 
number of industries.  In the years following China’s WTO accession, foreign companies 
increasingly steered their investment in China towards acquiring local Chinese companies, in 
part by leveraging on China’s WTO accession commitments.  Increased mergers and acquisitions 
by foreign companies heightened China’s concerns that its industries might be dominated or 
even controlled by foreign companies.  The recent intervention by the government in an 
attempted acquisition by the U.S. private equity firm Carlyle Group of Xugong Construction   - 25 - 
Machinery, China’s leading manufacturer of heavy construction equipment, reflected these 
concerns.  It was reported that Carlyle Group initially signed an agreement with Xugong to buy 
85% of its shares in October 2005.  However, the deal was fiercely opposed by government 
officials as well as rival companies.  About one year later, Carlyle Group agreed to take a less 
than 50% stake in Xugong in exchange for the government approval of the acquisition.
54   
The new limitations imposed on mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies are part 
of China’s broader efforts to scale back foreign investment in China in certain sensitive sectors.  
Since China’s accession to WTO, although China has more or less fulfilled its market access 
commitments, it has also revoked some of the preferential treatments previously accorded to 
foreign investors and, in some cases, has put in place some new restrictions on foreign 
investment.
55  Coincidentally or not, the flow of foreign investment into China has shown signs 
of levelling off in recent years.
56  
In light of China’s goal of limiting foreign investment in certain sectors, China may be 
tempted to use competition policy as a tool to achieve that goal.  The promulgation of the 2006 
M&A Rules is seen by many as the first step in that direction.  When drafts of the new antitrust 
law were being discussed, many multinational corporations feared that they would become the 
                                                 
54   See Carlyle Agrees to Hold Minority of Xugong’s Shares, SOHU BUSINESS ONLINE, October 17, 
2006, http://business.sohu.com/20061017/n245845506.shtml (last visited March 28, 2007). 
55   For example, on March 16, 2007, China’s National People’s Congress adopted the amended 
Corporate Income Tax Law that would abolish the preferential corporate tax treatment currently 
enjoyed by foreign-invested companies.  In December 2005, China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission imposed a moratorium on new foreign investment in Chinese securities brokerages.  
In August, 2006, China’s Banking Regulatory Commission announced a requirement that foreign 
banks incorporate their local operations in China if they want to engage in RMB-denominated 
business with Chinese individuals.  While these restrictions technically do not violate China’s 
WTO commitment, foreign investors have criticized them as steps in the wrong direction.  See 
Statement of John R. Dearie, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review 
Commission, August 22, 2006, 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_08_22_23wrts/06_08_22_23
_dearie_john.php (last visited March 28, 2007). 
56   In 2006, China saw a 4% decrease in foreign investment compared with the year before.  See 
Ariana Eunjung Cha, China Gets Cold Feet for Foreign Investment: New Regulations Spawn 
Fears of Economic Nationalism, THE WASHINGTON POST, February 2, 2007, Page D01.   - 26 - 
law’s first targets.
57  This fear was reinforced when a Chinese court in early 2007 decided to hear 
antitrust claims filed by a local Chinese company against a prominent multinational company.
58 
The temptation to rely on competition policy to deal with surging foreign investment 
leads to another challenge facing China’s antitrust policymakers: should the new antitrust law be 
focused primarily on foreign companies, or should it be applied equally to both foreign and 
domestic companies?  The answer undoubtedly is the latter.  While China may rightly be 
concerned about possible aggressive campaigns by behemoth multinational corporations to 
monopolize Chinese domestic markets, it would be a grave mistake for the new antitrust law to 
be intended for—or to be strictly enforced against—foreign companies only.  The losses to 
consumer welfare caused by the anticompetitive acts of domestic companies are no less real than 
the losses to consumer welfare caused by the anticompetitive acts of foreign companies, and 
indeed, the degree of monopolization by foreign companies, often exaggerated in the Chinese 
media, is far less than the degree of monopolization in the industries controlled by SOEs.  To 
focus the new antitrust law only on foreign companies, or to strictly enforce the new antitrust law 
only against foreign companies, would lead to missed opportunities to address a major source of 
distortion in China’s economy.  China’s antitrust policymakers should be reminded, therefore, 
that for the new antitrust law to be of any economic significance, it has to be aimed at domestic 
companies as much as it is aimed at foreign companies.   
 
D.  Treatment of Administrative Monopolies 
The most important feature of China’s draft antitrust law is the devotion of an entire 
chapter to the issue of administrative monopolies.  Chapter Five of the draft antitrust law sets 
forth the general principles dealing with governmental actions that have the intent or effect of 
creating monopolistic conditions.  It specifically lists several categories of governmental actions 
                                                 
57   See Rebecca Buchman, China Hurries Antitrust Law, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 11, 2004, 
page A7. 
58   On January 17, 2007, The Shanghai No 1 Intermediate People's Court heard claims by a local 
Chinese company that Sony and its joint venture in China engaged in unfair competition by 
designing their digital cameras to shut down when batteries made by competitors are installed.  
The court did not rule at the end of the hearing and the case is still pending.    - 27 - 
that are prohibited under the draft law: designation of deals, regional blockades, restrictions on 
bidding, restrictions on market entry, and restrictions on competition.  
The inclusion of the prohibition of administrative monopolies in the draft antitrust law 
has a tortuous history.  The prohibition appeared in the first several drafts released for comments 
beginning in 2002.  It was reported, however, that in December 2005 the State Council deleted 
the entire chapter of the draft law dealing with administrative monopolies from an internal draft 
and only kept a declaratory statement prohibiting administrative monopolies in principle in the 
general rules section.
59  In June 2006, the State Council officially approved a draft that did not 
contain the chapter on administrative monopolies.
60  But several weeks later, when the State 
Council submitted the draft law to the NPC Standing Committee for review, the chapter on 
administrative monopolies was added back in.
61  These unusual changes in the text of the draft 
law, more than anything else, reflect what perhaps is the biggest dilemma facing China’s 
antitrust policymakers—i.e., whether China should include provisions prohibiting administrative 
monopolies in the new antitrust law.  
The draft AML does not give a definition of “administrative monopolies.”  But suggested 
by the name, administrative monopolies are monopolies created by administrative agencies.  
Specifically, in the Chinese context, such monopolies result from the following three kinds of 
governmental actions: 
First, administrative monopolies result from governmental measures that are intended to 
restrict competition in a particular industry, or from governmental measures that compel certain 
anticompetitive conduct.  For example, in 1999, China’s Bureau of Civil Aviation issued an 
order prohibiting airlines from offering air ticket discounts, citing the adverse effect of price 
                                                 
59   See Xiaodong Xie, Anti-Administrative Monopolies Chapter Deleted in Entirety from Draft 
Antimonopoly Law, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, January 11, 2006, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/54816/54822/4016799.html (last visited March 28, 2007). 
60   See State Council Approves Draft Antimonopoly Law Without Chapter on Administrative 
Monopolies, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, June 8, 2006, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/4448654.html (last visited March 28, 2007). 
61   See Na Liu, Draft Antimonopoly Law on Schedule for Review; Chapter on Administrative 
Monopolies Added Back In, THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER, 
http://info.finance.hc360.com/2006/06/25102650097.shtml (last visited March 28, 2007).   - 28 - 
competition on the healthy development of the airline industry.
62   In the draft AML, such 
governmental measures are declared illegal under Articles 30 and 31. 
Second, administrative monopolies also result from governmental measures that mandate 
the use of products or services by certain producers, which usually are “affiliate companies” of 
the government agencies.  Those “affiliate companies” are in most cases SOEs or former SOEs 
currently or previously controlled by the government agencies in question.  A good example of 
this practice is that some local civil affair agencies in charge of issuing marriage licenses require 
applicants to take pictures to be affixed to marriage licenses only at designated photo studios.  
Such steering of business towards affiliated companies using government power is declared 
illegal under Article 26 of the draft AML.  
Third and most important, administrative monopolies also result from governmental 
actions that restrict market entry.  This problem is more serious at the local level, where the local 
governments are notoriously known for creating various barriers to firms from other localities.  
This local protectionism is what is commonly known as “regional blockage” and is declared 
illegal under Articles 27, 28, and 29. 
All of the three variants of administrative monopolies are made possible by the ability of 
governmental agencies, at both the central and local levels, with or without statutory authority, to 
require government approvals for a wide range of economic activities.  According to a survey 
conducted by the State Council, as of 2003 there were a total of 4,159 government programs in 
which approvals of some sort from various governmental agencies were required, and more than 
2,000 approval requirements were implemented without any legal basis.
63  To make things 
worse, in many cases businesses have to navigate through the maze of those approval 
requirements without clear guidance from the governmental agencies. 
How serious is the problem of administrative monopolies in China?  The following 
statistics provide a clue.  It is reported that since 1993, the SAIC investigated 5,642 cases of 
monopolies pursuant to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 519 of which were administrative 
                                                 
62   However, the ban on discount air tickets was frequently ignored by the airlines, and the ban was 
finally lifted in early 2003. 
63   See Jianjun Wang, Special Interests the Greatest Obstacle to Market Development, LIAOWANG 
NEWS WEEKLY, http://news.sohu.com/20061213/n247014585_1.shtml (last visited March 28, 
2007).   - 29 - 
monopolies.
64  The same report stated that since its establishment in 2003, MOFCOM has 
reviewed 432,841 policies of local governments that allegedly contained elements of regional 
blockades, pursuant to the 2001 Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades in Market Economic 
Activities.  Of those 432,841 policies, 301 were modified or annulled by MOFCOM.
65  On the 
face of the statistics, it may seem that administrative monopolies constitute only an insignificant 
part of the total cases being investigated or reviewed.  However, the source of the statistics 
observed that this is a result of selection bias, as the government authorities were reluctant to 
investigate or confront administrative monopolies because of what they saw as the futility of 
such actions.
66  
In deciding how to approach administrative monopolies in the new antitrust law, China’s 
antitrust policymakers face a real dilemma.  On one hand, as the ubiquity of administrative 
monopolies has made administrative monopolies the major source of monopolies in China’s 
economy, China’s antitrust policymakers feel obliged to address administrative monopolies in 
the new antitrust law.  Many commentators believe that without provisions prohibiting 
administrative monopolies, the new antitrust law would necessarily be incomplete and would 
lose much of its relevance.
67  Furthermore, without a chapter on administrative monopolies, the 
public may believe that the government does not have the resolve to fight monopolies at all and 
may discount the credibility of the other provisions of the law.  
On the other hand, prohibiting administrative monopolies in the new antitrust law will 
almost certainly yield few successes in the near future, given China’s current economic and 
political realities.  Using the new antitrust law to fight administrative monopolies faces two 
institutional problems that China’s political system is not yet ready to handle: 
                                                 
64   See Anti-Administrative Monopolies Chapter Deleted in Entirety from the AML, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, January 11, 2006, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/54816/54822/4016799.html (last 
visited March 28, 2007). 
65   See Id. 
66   See Id. 
67   See, e.g., Ya Jie, Antimonopoly Law Must Address Administrative Monopolies, China Industrial 
& Business Times, available at http://biz.163.com/06/0419/10/2F2JT1NE00021RH4.html (posted 
on April 19, 2006; last visited on March 12, 2007).   - 30 - 
First, at the central government level, if the various governmental agencies of the central 
government are made subject to the new antitrust law, the proposed Antimonopoly Enforcement 
Agency will be required to bring antitrust enforcement actions against government agencies of 
the same or even higher rank.  Unless China has a government system based on clearly defined 
rules of law—which China currently does not—such an institutional arrangement will inevitably 
create confusion within the political system and set off disruptive power struggles among 
different government agencies. 
Second, at the local government level, prohibiting administrative monopolies in the new 
antitrust law will have serious implications for the relationship between the central and local 
governments.  Enforcing the new antitrust law against local governments, whether by the 
proposed Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency or by the courts, will only exacerbate the so-called 
“central versus local governments” problem, i.e., the problem with enforcing the orders and 
policies of the central government at the local level.  The “central versus local governments” 
problem has existed in China since the first days of the Middle Kingdom.
68  “The mountain is 
high and the Emperor is far away.”  “Where there are policies from above, there are counter-
policies from below.”  These old Chinese sayings speak vividly to the troubled relationship 
between the central and local governments.  If China uses the new antitrust law to address local 
protectionism and “regional blockade,” will it be able to overcome the “central versus local 
governments” problem that it has not been able to overcome in the last 3,000 years?  The answer 
is obvious. 
Moreover, if China does include administrative monopolies in the draft AML, it will face 
another kind of credibility problem, this time pointing in the opposite direction.  If the 
government knows that it will not be able to enforce the prohibition of administrative 
monopolies and yet still includes it in the law, it may send a signal to the public that it does not 
                                                 
68   The relationship between the central and local governments has been problematic since the Zhou 
Dynasty (1,122 B.C.—225 B.C.) and has remained so until today.  One of the most dramatic 
episodes of the “central versus local governments” problem is the civil war waged by Emperor 
Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty in the 1670s against three feudal lords, who were granted their 
fiefdoms as rewards for their contributions to the establishment of the Qing Dynasty but who later 
grew defiant of the orders of the Emperor.  The war, spanning eight years and spreading to almost 
half of China’s territory at the time, ended with a complete victory of the Emperor.    - 31 - 
expect to strictly enforce every provision of the law.  As a result, the public may discount the 
government’s resolve in enforcing the new law as a whole.    
However, supporters of the prohibition on administrative monopolies in the AML would 
quickly point out that some variants of the prohibition are already contained in China’s current 
antitrust rules.  Article 30 of the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits restrictions on 
competition by using administrative power.  The 2001 Rules on Prohibiting Regional Blockades 
in Market Economic Activities specifically bans regional blockades.  Therefore, including the 
prohibition in the AML will not be something that is completely out of the ordinary and will be 
consistent with public expectations.  Indeed, supporters of the prohibition may argue that, 
although enforcement of the prohibition under the current antitrust rules is not very effective, 
including the prohibition in the new antitrust law is the only way to preserve continuity in the 
treatment of administrative monopolies in the antitrust law.  
No matter whether the prohibition of administrative monopolies is included in the AML 
or not, it is clear that China’s antitrust policymakers will face difficult issues either way.  These 
difficult issues may have been the primary reason behind the current gridlock on the draft AML.  
But whatever decision China’s policymakers may make with respect to administrative 
monopolies, they need to be fully aware of the consequences and implications of their decision.  
On one hand, if China’s antitrust policymakers eventually decide to exclude 
administrative monopolies from the AML, it will be important for them to keep in mind that such 
a decision will not be an endorsement of administrative monopolies, and nor will it be a decision 
to do nothing about them.  It will simply be an acknowledgment of the fact that the AML cannot 
cure all evils in one swoop, at least not at this time.  A decision to not address administrative 
monopolies in the AML will not make the AML irrelevant, either.  Although administrative 
monopolies undoubtedly are the major source of monopolistic behavior in China’s economy 
today, anticompetitive acts by economic entities that do not have government power are 
nonetheless very significant, and more importantly, are growing.  As the government further 
retreats from the economy, antitrust issues will be created increasingly not by the government, 
but by economic entities such as commercialized SOEs, private enterprises, and foreign 
companies.  By focusing on antitrust problems arising from economic behavior at this time, 
China essentially would start on a path with the least resistance, as it did with its general 
economic reforms three decades ago.  The hope is that the early success of reforms will create   - 32 - 
benefits to a wide swath of society and rebalance the distribution of vested interests in society, so 
much so that reforms that were previously unconceivable may become realistic goals later.  That 
is the essence of the Chinese-style incremental improvements that have worked so well in 
China’s general economic reforms so far.  When it comes to antitrust, the same incremental 
approach may be worth a try.   
On the other hand, if China’s antitrust policymakers eventually decide to address 
administrative monopolies in the AML, it will be important for them not to expect immediate 
success.  Administrative monopolies are such a problem in China that any success in dealing 
with them is likely to come about only incrementally.  It is also important for the Chinese 
policymakers to not see the AML as the sole vehicle or even the most important vehicle through 
which to address administrative monopolies.
69  The nature of administrative monopolies means 
that their elimination will necessarily require other reforms, such as constitutional and 
government structure reforms.  Indeed, in most developed countries, such as in the United States, 
administrative monopolies are dealt with in the general antitrust law only to the extent that they 
are a result of the action of the state as market participant.  In dealing with monopolistic 
conditions created by the state as sovereignty and market regulator, the United States generally 
leaves the job to the democratic legislative processes at both the federal and state levels, while 
using certain important legal mechanisms—such as the “Dormant Commerce Clause”
70 and the 
federalism doctrine
71—to correct any failures of the democratic processes in this regard.   
                                                 
69   It seems that China’s antitrust policymakers are well aware of this point.  Article 6 of the current 
draft AML points out that the furtherance of reforms of the government functions are needed to 
rein in the abuse of administrative power that harms competition.  This seems to indicate a 
recognition among Chinese authorities that administrative monopolies are not something that will 
be cured by the AML alone. 
70   The U.S. constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce in the so-called 
“Commerce Clause.”  By negative implication, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that states do not 
have the power to regulate interstate commerce.  This so-called “Dormant Commerce Clause” 
doctrine played a vital role in striking down state regulations that were aimed at or had the effect 
of blockading the commerce of other states.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 
(invalidating New York’s grant of steamboat monopoly); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 
U.S. 511 (1935) (holding that New York may not protect its local interests by limiting access to 
local markets by out-of-state milk sellers); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) 
(invalidating a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of most solid or liquid waste 
which originated or was collected outside of the territorial limits of New Jersey); Granholm v. 
Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (ruling that New York and Michigan laws allowing in-state wineries   - 33 - 
  
E.  Antitrust Enforcement  
1.  Which Agency? 
An important consideration in drafting any law in any country is how the law is going to 
be enforced.  This is more so in China, where enforcement of a law in many cases is a larger 
issue than the law itself.   
The responsibility for enforcing China’s current antitrust rules is shared by at least three 
agencies: the SAIC as authorized by the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the National 
Development and Reform Commission as authorized by the 2003 Provisional Rules on 
Prevention of Monopoly Pricing, and MOFCOM as authorized by the 2006 M&A Rules.  In 
particular, SAIC and MOFCOM are the two main candidates to house the new Antimonopoly 
Enforcement Agency.   An alternative to having SAIC or MOFCOM enforce the AML is to 
create a new agency.     
Earlier drafts of the AML proposed the establishment of the Antimonopoly Enforcement 
Agency under the State Council. There was speculation that the Antimonopoly Enforcement 
Agency would be created within an existing ministry.  Given the prominent roles SAIC and 
MOFCOM play in enforcing the current antitrust rules, these two agencies naturally become the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to ship wine to consumers directly but prohibiting out-of-state wineries from doing the same is 
unconstitutional). 
71   Under the federalism doctrine, the U.S. federal government can only exercise power granted by 
the U.S. Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court has used the federalism doctrine to invalidate 
federal laws that had the purpose or effect of limiting competition.  Most notably, in 1935, in the 
“sick chicken” case, the U.S. Supreme Court stuck down one of the most dramatic efforts by the 
Roosevelt Administration to stabilize the U.S. economy during the Great Depression—the 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (“NIRA”).  See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  Enacted to combat falling prices and intensifying competition 
during the Great Depression, the NIRA authorized the President, ordinarily upon application by 
trade associations, to promulgate “codes of fair competition” for the trade or industry.  Several 
hundred codes were adopted in accordance with the NIRA.  The codes usually contained 
provisions concerning minimum wages and prices, maximum hours, and unfair trade practices.  
In 1935, the Supreme Court struck down the entire act, holding that in enacting the act, Congress 
exceeded its commerce power and unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power.  
Interestingly, there seems to be a striking resemblance between the “codes of fair competition” 
authorized under the NIRA and the “industrial self-disciplines” authorized by the Chinese 
government today.  See discussion of the “industrial self-disciplines” in section IV.B.   - 34 - 
leading candidates to house the future Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency.  SAIC is primarily 
charged with the micromanagement of the market activities, ranging from business and 
trademark registration to street market regulation.  SAIC has branches in virtually every city in 
China.  At the central level, SAIC has a Bureau of Fair Trade, under which there is an 
Antimonopoly Division.  However, this division has only five staff members.
72  In March 2004, 
SAIC released an investigative report that described multinational companies’ alleged 
anticompetitive behavior in China.
73  
The other candidate enforcement agency is MOFCOM, a powerful ministry created 
during the government restructuring in 2003 that combined the former Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation and many functions of the former SETC.  In late 2004, MOFCOM 
established an Antimonopoly Investigation Office under the Department of Treaty and Law.
74 
This office now has about the same level of staffing as its counterpart in SAIC.  Both agencies 
were designated as the agencies to review foreign acquisitions of domestic companies in the 
2006 M&A Rules.
75  However, the Antitrust Filing Guidelines accompanying the M&A Rules 
was issued by MOFCOM alone.  Neither office seems to have enough manpower or resources at 
present to handle potentially vast amount of antitrust work under the AML.  The amount of 
resources needed is likely to be large given the size of China’s economy and the amount of 
anticompetitive activity currently present in the marketplace. Even if staffing levels can be 
increased quickly, the relevant knowledge, skills and experience take time to build. 
An early 2004 draft proposed to establish the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency under 
the MOFCOM, but later drafts have retreated from that position.  The current draft only states 
that an Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency will be established, without specifying where it will 
                                                 
72   See SAIC, Functions, Organization, and Staffing of the Bureau of Fair Trade, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zhzjg/jig_3.html (last visited March 28, 2007).  
73   See SAIC, Multinational Companies’ Competition Restricting Behavior and Counter Measures, 
SAIC Pub. No. 5, 2004. 
74   See MOFCOM Establishes Antimonopoly Investigation Office, CHINA NEWS NET, September 17, 
2004, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/661853.htm (last visited March 28, 2007).  
Noticeably, this was a few months after the release of the SAIC report. 
75   See supra note 11.   - 35 - 
be established.
76  No matter who will become the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, however, 
it will be wise to have one instead of two enforcement agencies, as a single enforcement agency 
avoids the potential inconsistency that may be created in a dual enforcement structure.  
In addition to the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, the current draft AML proposes 
the establishment of an Antimonopoly Commission directly under the State Council.  The 
Antimonopoly Commission is intended to be an advisory body staffed by high level officials 
from different government agencies.  The day-to-day AML enforcement activities will be carried 
out by the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency.   
The establishment of the new Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency will necessarily result 
in diminished roles for the agencies currently responsible for antitrust enforcement and 
regulatory supervision.  Perhaps to reduce the resistance from these agencies, the current draft 
makes the compromise that monopolistic activities subject to the AML that are also within the 
scope of other regulatory agencies’ investigative power based on other laws and administrative 
regulations will be investigated by those other agencies, and these other agencies are required to 
report their enforcement results to the Antimonopoly Commission.  The Antimonopoly 
Enforcement Agency investigates such matters only when they are not investigated by other 
agencies.  However, this compromise would eliminate one of the major advantages of the AML 
over the current fragmented antitrust laws—i.e., a uniform enforcement agency that can be 
counted on enforcing the antitrust law in a consistent and predictable manner.  Similar provisions 
of US law have not been successful in promoting competition in regulated industries. Because of 
regulatory capture, regulators often seek to protect regulated firms from outside entry and from 
competition among themselves. Giving these regulators exclusive jurisdiction to enforce antitrust 
law within their jurisdictions will likely result in competition taking a back seat to industry 
interests.  
2.  Which Enforcement Priorities? 
Given the limited institutional capability and resources at least at the initial stage, China’s 
future Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency will need to set priorities for its enforcement goals.  
                                                 
76   See Article 5 of the current draft of the AML.   - 36 - 
A good start is to focus first on horizontal restraints of trade, especially cases of price fixing and 
bid rigging, where large benefits can often be obtained for consumers by breaking up the cartels 
and introducing competition. Enforcement in this area has high payoffs because it is likely to 
deter behavior that harms consumers and unlikely to erroneously deter competitive behavior that 
benefits consumers. 
In countries with new competition policies, there is often a tendency to focus on complex 
vertical relationships because of complaints about these matters filed by competitors, and 
consumer protection issues because of great popular appeal.  Oftentimes, certain contracts or 
contractual terms, or pricing schemes in general, may strike people as unfair, even if they 
actually promote economic efficiency.  Examples include vertical price restraints, unilateral 
refusals to deal, certain tying arrangements, “unfairly high price in selling or unfairly low price 
in purchasing,” predatory pricing, and price discrimination.
77  In societies that are skeptical of 
the legitimacy of markets, enforcement focusing on these issues often illustrates the popular or 
ideological basis for the skepticism.  Antitrust action in these areas requires painstaking 
investigation and analysis, not merely to decide whether the behavior in question is harmful or 
beneficial to consumers, but to avoid creating unintended deterrent effects on future economic 
activity that is beneficial to consumers.  In general, it is important to resist the temptation to give 
priority to investigations that consume a vast amount of resources but have minimal benefits. 
Although the antitrust review of proposed mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures is a 
very useful device to avoid anticompetitive concentration without the messy complication of ex 
post disassembly of a consummated transaction, the amount of work involved can easily be 
overwhelming.  Unfortunately, the current draft AML applies to all consolidations that meet the 
sales thresholds rather than just consolidations of competing firms.  The effect could be to 
unnecessarily burden the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency and increase the delays associated 
with obtaining agency clearance for mergers with little or no potential for anticompetitive 
effects, including many beneficial mergers.  It is important for the Antimonopoly Enforcement 
Agency to give quick clearance to mergers that do not pose a competition issue and focus on 
                                                 
77   See current draft AML, Articles 8 and 15.   - 37 - 
those that have clear overlaps.  This implies the need for a limit on the amount of time 
transactions are held up pending agency decisions on enforcement. 
 
3.  The Importance of Transparency and Consistency 
For the AML to influence business behavior in the intended way, businesses need to form 
both correct and clear expectations about enforcement.  An earlier draft of the AML states that 
“the enforcement authority should publish its decisions,” a requirement that makes sense only if 
the published opinions are intended (as they should be) to influence future behavior of business 
firms.  Publication of decisions and the reasoning behind them, however, is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for effective deterrence.  It is also necessary to have a rule that serves the 
purpose, in a common law system, of “stare decisis.”  That is, the enforcement authority must to 
some extent be bound by its prior decisions and reasoning.  If prosecutors (or courts) can decide 
each case without regard to the ways in which similar facts have been analyzed and treated in the 
recent past, private firms have no basis to form expectations about the consequences of their 
actions.  The effect of this is to increase the risks of doing business, thus discouraging investment 
by ruling out investment projects that do not have a sufficiently high expected return to 
compensate investors for taking on the risk of (erroneous) antitrust prosecution.  
The requirement to publish enforcement decisions would be a good first step to 
implement the AML in a transparent and consistent way.  However, the current draft has 
changed this language to “the enforcement authority may publish its decisions.”  This subtle 
change seems to reflect a reluctance of the Chinese authorities to commit to full disclosure of its 
future antitrust decisions, which is not helpful for private firms attempting to form expectations 
about the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency’s actions.  This retreat from a firm commitment to 
transparency and consistency may reflect the consideration that China’s antitrust authorities may 
well take into account other non-competition factors, such as public interest and the health of the 
national economy, in deciding competition cases, as stated in the draft AML.  But here as well, 
making the enforcement agency responsible for such broad considerations may be a mistake. The 
agency’s decisions will be subject to political review, and it is in that review process that such 
considerations may enter. 
More generally, unless antitrust enforcers are to attempt to examine every transaction in 
the economy, deterrence is the principal vector by which antitrust (and most other) laws achieve   - 38 - 
their effects on economic behavior.  Deterrence of anticompetitive behavior, however, has a dark 
side: inadvertent deterrence of efficient behavior.  The deterrent effect of a law or regulation is 
affected by the probability of detection and successful prosecution (itself a function of 
enforcement resources), the firm’s understanding of the law, and the penalties expected to result 
from successful prosecution.  Very effective deterrence of anticompetitive behavior will also 
deter pro-competitive behavior if the law is unclear to private decision-makers or if private 
decision-makers anticipate frequent errors by prosecutors and judges.
78  Thus, transparency and 
consistency in enforcement are important in helping businesses form the right expectations. 
The proposed law clearly contemplates reliance on administrative rather than judicial 
machinery as its primary enforcement mechanism, and calls for the enforcement agency to issue 
detailed rules and regulations to implement the law.  In the end, given China’s legal 
environment, as discussed in section III.C, it is these rules and their enforcement that will matter 
most.  It would be inappropriate to evaluate the proposed law as if it were, as it would be in the 
U.S., a set of instructions intended for the judiciary to interpret.   
In the current draft AML, private parties are given the right to judicial review if they are 
not satisfied with the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency’s decisions.  Private parties are also 
entitled to recover damages resulting from monopolistic behavior.  In the context of China’s 
current legal system, it remains unclear whether this right increases or decreases the 
predictability of the process and therefore the potential for promotion of economic efficiency and 
growth.  It is not clear what level of the courts will handle such appeals and lawsuits or whether 
the courts’ decisions will be final.  In general, the courts’ ability to adjudicate antitrust cases is 
doubtful at this time, as they do not seem to have the necessary expertise.  
China’s antitrust policymakers are aware of the inadequate capacity of the courts in 
adjudicating antitrust cases under the AML.  In some earlier drafts, civil liabilities and recovery 
of damages through litigation were emphasized.  One draft even suggested a detailed 
methodology of computing damages.  Later drafts, however, minimized direct mentions of the 
courts’ role.  Apparently there is hesitance to rely on the judicial system to handle antitrust cases.  
                                                 
78   See generally, Kenneth Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of 
Antitrust, U.S. Dept. of Justice, EAG Working Paper 4-11 (Washington, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
2004).   - 39 - 
To the extent administrative agencies are more competent in carrying out the AML enforcement, 
it makes sense at least in the short term to rely more on administrative decisions and remedies.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
China has come a long way since the drafting process of the AML began in 1994.  
Compared with China’s current antitrust laws, the draft AML made significant progress in terms 
of comprehensiveness, clarity, and consistency with economic principles.  Despite the progress, 
China’s antitrust policymakers still face significant challenges in reforming the country’s 
competition policies.  Those challenges implicate many of the most fundamental issues arising 
from China’s transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy.  The 
resolution of those issues, however, needs not precede the adoption of the new AML.   
Meanwhile, while the AML will be an important tool to carry out China’s competition 
policy reforms, it is not the only one.  Other reforms, such as SOE reforms, market entry reforms, 
constitutional and government structure reforms, and legal reforms, to name a few, will be 
indispensable to China’s goal of promoting competition in its economy.  In light of the 
complexity of the issues in China’s competition policy reforms, it will be important for China’s 
antitrust policymakers to not expect the AML to cure all evils in one swoop.  Rather, China will 
be better served to take an incremental approach and enact an AML that is tailored to China’s 
current realities, while keeping the momentum to engage in other reforms necessary to fully 
implement China’s competition policy goals.   